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Abstract
The aim of this study is to examine variance of redistribution in dictatorships and their systematic patterns. Unlike the previous researches, this study argues that the redistribution is displayed differently depending on the nature of the political institutions, which can restrict the decision of the dictator. It is expected that it would have a consistent and systematic impact on the policy choices by carrying out the role of the intermediary between the rulers and the ruled. To explore the effect of varieties of dictatorships on redistribution on the institutional level, about 89 dictatorships between 1986 and 2011 in the world are examined as a cross-national time-series data. As a result, the least redistributive dictatorship subtype is monarch and the most redistributive one is military. One-party dictatorship is less distributive than multi-party one. As a consequence, the models containing control variables under some conditions explain the systematic patterns of redistribution in dictatorships as well. Moreover, the systematic patterns mean that the policy choices of dictatorships are not contingent but intentional. Also, these results show the limits of previous political economic theories that are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of dictatorships.
BibTeX citation
@article{parkyilee2017,
Author = {Sanghoon Park, Daejin Yi, and Jaemook Lee},
Doi = {10.32355/OUGHTOPIA.2017.05.32.1.271},
Journal = {OUGHTOPIA},
Number = {1},
Pages = {271--314},
Title = {Dictatorships and Redistribution: Empirical Analysis of Redistribution by Dictatorship Sub-regime Type},
Volume = {32},
Year = {2017}}