Abstract
Why do some autocrats expand universal welfare while others do not? This study examines the commitment problem autocrats confront when the social composition of their ruling coalitions changes. I argue that universal welfare serves as a costly and visible signal of commitment to newly incorporated mass constituencies. This signal should be strongest when mass incorporation coincides with elite displacement, thereby reallocating the coalition itself. It should also matter most early in a rule, before a track record of rule can make the ruler’s promises more credible. I examine these expectations using leader-year data on autocrats from 1875 to 2015. I measure coalition change against the coalition each leader inherits, distinguish mass incorporation according to concurrent changes in elite dependence, and trace the association across tenure. Country fixed effects models show that welfare universalism rises when a ruler incorporates mass-based groups. Succession-level evidence shows that this increase emerges when the ruler takes office and persists without reversion. The association is concentrated in the first decade of rule and weakens as tenure lengthens, although the evidence does not establish comparable decay within individual rulers’ spells. The largest estimates occur when mass incorporation coincides with elite displacement, although this pattern rests on very few episodes. Shifts away from the masses are not associated with a comparable change, and the main association survives the removal of any single leader or country. Welfare provision under autocracy therefore cannot be understood through social need alone. It also reflects the strategic problem of committing to a changing coalition.